. Some of the new developments in infant research (e.g., 
therapy process, while the clientcentered approach is interested in applying its principles outside of therapy so that people can live more constructively. Rogers's client- centered therapy withHeinz Kohut's selfpsychol ogy (Bohart, 1991; Kahn, 1985 Kahn, , 1989a Stolorow, 1976; Tobin, 1990 Tobin, , 1991 (Kuhn, 1962) (Aron, 1990; Ghent, 1989) . Some of the new developments in infant research (e.g., the work of Daniel Stern [1985] and Beatrice Beebe [1985] Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft, 1994a : Sto lorow & Atwood, 1992 matter, psychoanalysis could no longer define healthy functioning as a conformity to some objective reality. By placing objective reality out side the domain of psychoanalysis, Kohut was influential in bringing about a change from the one-person to a two-person psychology. I would like to stress that Kohut never denied the vital therapeutic function of empathy, as some clientcentered people, including Rogers (19866) , claimed; however, a primary concern of his was to correct some of the abuses in traditional psy choanalysis, with its hidden moral and educa tional goals for the patient (Kohut, 1982, p. 399) .
For some time now there has been considerable interest in comparing Carl
Next, I will discuss the topic of the therapist's subjectivity, or what psychoanalysts have tradi tionally called countertransference. Stolorow and his coworkers have been interested in how the subjectivity of the therapist influences the subjec tivity of the patient. For example, Stolorow and Atwood (1992, pp. 103-122) describe intriguing examples of therapeutic stalemates and their reso lutionwhich illustrate how the subjectivity of the therapist can importantly affect the experiences of the patient.
In light of Stolorow's recent contributions to self psychology I will pose and, at the end of this article, attempt to answer several questions regarding client-centered therapy. The answers to these questions will indicate the extent to which client-centered therapy, at its core, is similar to self psychology. These questions are:
(1) Is client-centered therapy a one-person psy chology, focusing primarily on the psychology of theclient,or is it a two-person, relational psychol ogy, wherethe frameof reference of the therapist is considered? Is therelational aspect an important feature of the client-centered approach?
(2) In the client-centered approach is the nature of the subjectivity of the therapist, that is, how the therapist organizes his/her world, sufficiently reflected upon and illuminated? In other words, do client-centered therapists become reflectively aware of how they may inadvertently influence their clients because of their own unique his tories?
(3) Psychoanalysts have been concerned that theirown subjective truths, particularly those that derive from their theories (e.g., drives and de fenses against thosedrives), can inadvertently in fluence their perception of their patients. Does the client-centered approach, too, have a theory, such as the actualizing tendency, that can color how the therapist sees the client? Or is it the very nature of client-centered theory that it tries its bestto avoid harboring anypreconceptions about
The Intersubjective Perspective what a client is experiencing? Is the avoidance of any preconceptions about a client's experience oneof the most important contributions of Rogers and his associates? (4) Another topic for discussion is the different therapeutic methods for Stolorow and Rogers;for example, Stolorow desires to make an active "empathic inquiry" into the subjective life of the pa tient so as to bring to reflective awareness how the patient organizes his/her experiences, while Rogers (1986a, pp. 207-208; Bohart, 1991, p. 41) would just want to be a companion to the client as the client makes choices and decisions, as he/she wishes.
Before going further I would like to distinguish between client-centered therapy and the personcentered approach. The person-centeredapproach seeks to apply the hypotheses that Rogers derived as a client-centered therapist to broader areas out side of therapy, such as international relations, education, and family relations. The central hy pothesis that both client-centered therapy and the person-centered approach share is that "persons have within themselves vast resources for selfunderstanding and for constructive changes in ways of being and behaving and that these re sources can best be released and realized in a relationship with certain definable qualities" (Rogers & Sanford, 1984 , p. 1374 . These defin able qualities that are present in a beneficial rela tionship are unconditional positive regard, empa thy, and genuineness.
One-Person Approach
Freud was deeply influenced by the scientific method of his day, which has been called an objectivist epistemology (Orange, 1992 ). Freud's early neurological investigationsand his theory of instinctual drives reflect these objectivist, natural science ideals. According to Orange (1992, pp. 193-194) empiricism is a common form of ob jectivismwhichstressesthe importance of "objec tive reality" and "the facts." Orange (1992) noted that in recent philosophy of science "this empiri cism took the form of a demand that any theory had to meet the test of falsifiability to qualify as scientific. . . . Any theory that could not be falsified by experimental evidence had no cogni tive significance" (pp. 193-194) . The concept of transference as presented by Freud in the early days of psychoanalysis was influenced by this objectivist epistemology. A major criterion of psychological health, for the objectivists, was access to the facts, or reality testing. In psychoanalysis, objectivists, who pri marily wanted to be scientific, claimed that trans ference consisted of distortions of reality or of the facts, and that these distortions can be evalu ated or judged by the analyst-observer (Orange, 1992, p. 194) . Proponents of this approach advo cated the disciplined use of abstinence, neutrality, and a blank screen (Aron, 1990, p. 481) , so that the distorted perceptions of the patient, which would manifest themselves in the transference, could be analyzed away by the "realistic" analyst.
Analysts, I am sure, also came to value neutral ity and abstinence as a protection from getting emotionally overinvolved with their patients as some early analysts like Sandor Ferenczi did. As McLaughlin (1981) noted, neutrality had the ben efit of affording "the analyst the protected role of detached observer vis-vis the intensities on both sides of the couch" (p. 659).
Aron (1991) For successful therapy to occur the patient had to change his/her reality so that it would conform to that of the analyst. Commenting on this state of affairs Schwaber (1983) said, "two realities, hierarchically arranged, remained embedded in this outlook: the one the patient experiences, and the one the analyst 'knows'" (p. 386). The thera peutic goal was to reduce to a minimum the pa tient's distortion of the outer world. "The aim is to help the patient gradually shift or 'correct' his view as he attains more mature functioning" (Schwaber, 1983, p. 384) .
"Independence". and "autonomy" were im portant values in this one-person psychology. For example, (pp. 13-14) . commented that by emphasizing independence as a criteria for mental 32 health, analysts sought to deny the vulnerability inherent in acknowledging the continual embeddedness of human experience in an intersubjective context. In other words, according to , analysts wanted to avoid ad mitting "the unbearable embeddedness of being" (p. 22). This one-person model was dominant in psy choanalysis until Kohut's ideas, starting with his 1959 paper (Kohut, 1959) , helped bring about a change in outlook. Schwaber (1983, p. 380) describes the crucial change in Kohut's listening stance with his well-known patient Miss F. Kohut (1971) was trying unsuccessfully to influence Miss F by having her accept certain traditional analytic interpretations, which Kohut indicated, only infuriated her. Kohut (1971) I would like to remark, at this point, how far ahead of the psychoanalysts Rogers was in appre ciating the validity of the subjectivity of the cli ent. It is remarkable that it is only relatively re cently, as a result of Kohut and others, that psychoanalysts are coming to realize that the pa tient's view of reality is as legitimate as the ana lyst's view. And, as client-centered people appre ciate, this is what Rogers was saying as far back as the early 1940s (Rogers, 1942) .
Two-Person Approach
There has been a change in the world of physics generated by the discoveries in quantum physics (Sucharov, 1994) . In classical physics there was a sharp separation between the observer and the observed, which led to a scientific objectivity in dependent of any observational stance. In the new physics of Einstein, Planck, and Heisenberg "the field that is observed, of necessity, includes the observer" (Kohut, 1984, p. 41) , which leads to a relativity of perception, and in principle, the absence of an objective reality (Kohut, 1984, p. 36) .
Associated with the changes in physics, there have been important changes in otherdisciplines, such as psychoanalysis. Kohut (1984, p. 41 ) con tributed to the changes with his appreciation that there is a continual impact of the observer and his/ her theories on what is being observed. Stolorow, Atwood, and Brandchaft (19946) , in describing the new paradigm that is evolving, said "it is not the isolated individual mind ... but the larger system created by the mutual interplay between the subjective worlds of patient and analyst, or of child and caregiver, that constitutes the proper domain of psychoanalytic inquiry" (p. x). In this relational paradigm "transference and countertransferencetogether form an intersubjective sys tem of reciprocal mutual influence" (Stolorow, 1994, p. 10), and there is an appreciation that "each participant's reaction is a product of his/ her construal of the cues communicated by the other" (Eagle, 1993, p. 102fn Today's infant research has clearly demonstrated how the child's capacity for self-regulation is based, not on the child alone, but on the dyad, that is, the child-caregiver system of mutual regu lation (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988) . Beebe and Lachmann (1988) note that what is cognitively represented in the infant "is not simply interiorized action, but interiorized interaction: not simply the infant's action,norsimply theenviron ment's response, but the dynamic mutual influ ence between the two" (p. 8).
As a resultof this shiftin emphasis, the analyst now must pay closer attention to his/her contribu tionto thepatient's reactions. Forexample, Aron (1990) commented, "the implication of a twoperson psychologyis that who the analyst is. . ., his/her very character, makes a real difference for the analysand" (p. 479). And Thomson (1994), in describing Stolorow's intersubjectivity theory,
The Intersubjective Perspective says it "places special emphasis on the examina tion of the minute and subtle effects of the ana-l yst's real presence and interventions as subjec tively experienced by the patient" (p. 132). Stolorow, Atwood, and Brandchaft (19946) note that this new paradigm allows the analyst much greater flexibility to explore new modes of therapeutic intervention "so long as the analyst consistently investigates the impact of his tech niques, style, and theoretical assumptions on the patient's experience and on the course of the ther apeutic process" (p. xi). Also with this twoperson, relational paradigm, neither participant has a privileged view of reality (Stolorow, At wood, & Brandchaft, 19946, pp. xi) . This change in psychoanalysis from a oneperson to a two-person psychology aptly illus trates what Kuhn (1962) described as a paradigm crisis and shift. Kuhn (1962, pp. 74-75) said, "a novel theory emerged only after a prolonged fail ure in the normal problem-solvingactivity" of the earlier paradigm. With the one-person paradigm a serious crisis, with considerable malaise (see Kuhn, 1962, pp. 82-84) , existed, for example, patients were drawn into conflict with analysts about the nature of reality, patients were blamed for resisting analytic interpretations (as in "nega tive therapeutic reactions"), power was unevenly distributed, and therapeutic stalemates were com mon. Furthermore, in Rogers's work, the subjec tivity of the client was appreciated in a way that a one-person paradigm, focused on objective real ity, didn't permit. Withthe newtwo-person para digm, the above conflicts eased and therapeutic effectiveness in psychoanalysis has been enhanced.
Kohut and Stolorow
Kohut was interested in psychological states in which the structure that organizes the experience of self is weak or unsteady, that is, where devel opmental misattunements have arrested personal ity growth. The concept of a "selfobject" is im portant in Kohut's theorizing (Trop, 1994, pp. 77-78) . A "selfobject" is the experience of an other person who is completely attuned to the needs of one's "self." According to Kohut, self- object experiences in the therapeutic relationship correctdevelopmental deficits and allow the orga nization of the self to become strongerand more cohesive. Therapeutic growth, for Kohut, was not associated with becoming more independent, as it was for the classical analysts, but rather with acquiring the ability to seek out and establish self-object experiences on a mature, adult level. Kohut (1984) (Trap, 1994, p. 78 And Stolorow, Atwood, and Brandchaft (1992) (Orange, 1994. p. 185) . Kohut (1971) (Kohut, 1984, p. 37) . Kohut (1971) (Orange, 1994; Schwaber, 1983, p. 381; Thomson, 1994) . For example. Orange (1994) (pp. 179-180) ? Orange (1994) As examples of our history influencing us Eagle (1993) mentioned "those aspects of countertrans ference that are expressed subtly through such dimensions as vocal qualities, ways of listening, choice and tone of interpretations, choice of mate rial on which to focus, decisions regarding termi nation, and so on" (p. 102fh). Aron (1991) has been critical of the term "countertransference" (see also McLaughlin, 1981, p. 655 Orange (1994) agrees with this criticism and sug gests "cotransference would better acknowledge our participation with the patient in the intersub jective field . . . of the psychoanalytic dialogue" (p. 180). Orange (1994, pp. 181-185 ) also presents a philosophical discussion of prejudice, which is fascinating, noting that prejudice is inevitable, since everyone has a point of view or perspective. She comments that the philosopher Gadamer sought to remove the negative connotations from the word prejudice. Orange (1994) Shlien's (1987) criticism of the transference concept. Shlien argued that transfer ence is a fiction since the reason the client gets angry at or falls in love with the therapist always has something to do with the way the therapist has acted. Self psychologists are now essentially agreeing with Shlien when they say that, in their mutual interaction, everything about the therapist is influencing the client, and vice versa. Thus, with the two-person paradigm, the idea of trans ference as a distortion disappears.
Some Examples
In this section I will present examples of how the subjectivity of the therapist can unknowingly influence the patient in ways that may interfere with therapeutic progress. I will conclude by sum marizing one of the case reports from Stolorow and Atwood's (1992, pp. 103-122) chapter on this topic.
(1) Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood (1987, p. 113 ) cite a movie episode described by Kernberg (1975, pp. 245-246) where a nurse, who is a decent young woman, is taking care of a very destructive and severely ill patient. The patient treats the nurse coldly and with unscrupulous ex ploitation, and, as a result, the nurse develops a hatred for her patient. Dramatically, the nurse retaliates by mistreating her patient cruelly. Sto lorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood (1987) comment that the nurse needed at least some caring respon siveness from her patient in order to regulate her psychological well-being. When her psychologi cal needs were repeatedly frustrated, the nurse's narcissistic vulnerability triggered her cruelty. Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood (1987) then say, "we have observed such factors at work in ourselves and regard them as to some degree uni versal in therapeutic relationships" (p. 114). In other words, therapists are not above being narcissistically injured, and that unconscious retaliatory actions toward clients in situations where the ther apist's self has been wounded may be more com mon than acknowledged.
(2) I had a client who was quite challenging for me. She gave up her marriage with a conventional and, according to her, controlling and unloving husband who wanted her back, and began a series of relationships with younger, racially and cultur ally different, and for a time in my mind, inappro priate men, who were rejecting and hurting her deeply. It was hard for me to decenter from what I thought would be best for her. Could it be, by Schwaber (1983, pp. 389-390) Thomson (1994, pp. 128-129) describes an episode where a patient's friend died from leukemia. Thomson Thomson (1994) 
re marks that "ultimately, the analyst, by means of inner processing, may be able to convert his anger, hurt, or other aversive reactions into signals so that they no longer block access to the kernels of truth in the patient's observations" (p. 135). Schwaber (1983) comments eloquently on this issue. She said, in discussing two of her patients: I felt that I had been making every 'reasonable' effort to attune to their worlds; if they then did not see me that way, it was their neuroses which caused them to misperceive, preventing them from attaining a more 'realistic' view. When I recog nized that from their vantage point, there is another way to experience my responses to them, and that I cannot be the arbiter of which is the more valid-theirs or mine-I shifted my mode of attunement and was led on to a pathway of discovery of dimensions of their inner world hitherto unknown (p. 390).
On the same issue, Schwaber (1993) (5) Stolorow and Atwood (1992, pp. 103-122) ' (p. 119) . The therapist, by working through his denial of the child in him, was able "to make empathic contact with the traumatized child-self' (p. 121)of Sarah, and the therapy with her resumed productively. Discussion I will now attempt to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this article about clientcentered therapy. The answers to these questions will indicate the extent of the core compatibility of the client-centered and self psychological ap proaches. Obviouslygiving unbiased and concise answers to these questions is not a simple and uncomplicated task.
(1) Is client-centered therapy a one-person psy chology, focusing primarily on the psychology of the client, as when reflecting a client's feelings, or is it a two-person relational psychology, where the therapist as a person is involved in the thera peutic relationship? Clearly Rogers's way of interacting changed, over time, from a more formal, professional atti tude to a more relaxed, spontaneous and human way of relating (Bradley, 1994) . At the inception of client-centered therapy, from about 1938 until the late 1940s, the focus was on the framework of the client, and less attention was paid to the person of the therapist. For example, Rogers and Sanford (1984) say about client-centered therapy during that time period, "reflection of feeling and nondirective techniques were its main identifying marks so far as the professional world was con cerned" (p. 1374). Kirschenbaum (1979) has said of this time period, "technique was the thing. Just as free association was the primary technique for the classical psychoanalyst, reflection of feelings was the primary technique to Rogers, the key to the whole process, the source of all growth in nondirective therapy" (p. 136). Thome (1992, p. 88 ) also commented about the "non-relational" aspect of Rogers's early work.
Regarding this issue, Raskin (personalcommu nication, August 30, 1995) Raskin believes that the involvement "of the ther apist in the relationship changed radically soon
The Intersubjective Perspective after Rogers arrived at the University of Chicago in 1945." With two graduate students, Oliver Bown and Eugene Streich, Rogers began to de scribe the "therapist as entering into the relation ship in a much more full and personal manner" (Raskin, personal communication, August 30, 1995) .
In addition to Rogers's work with graduate stu dents at the University of Chicago, three other factors may have helpedRogers, overtime, to use more of his own self in the therapeuticinteraction. These other factors were: (a) the "Wisconsin proj ect" of the late 1950s with schizophrenic patients which"gave rise to an increased emphasis on the therapist's use of his own thoughts and feelings in order to establish contact with persons" who were mostly uncommunicative (Kirschenbaum, 1979, p. 277; Thome, 1992, pp. 83-84) , (b) the dialogue with Martin Buber, in 1957, on "I-thou" interactions, which emphasized a "real reciproc ity" in relationships (Thome, 1992, pp. 69-70, 83-84) , and, probably,mostimportantly (Raskin, personal communication, August 30, 1995) , (c) the intensivegroupexperiencesof his Califor nia years (after 1963) which Rogers participated in regularly (see also Thome, 1992, p. 84) .
By the 1980s Rogers was saying that genuine ness or congruence was the most important and basic of the three necessary and sufficient condi tions (Rogers &Sanford, 'l984, p. 1378) . Also in the 1980s, when responding to a questioner in the audience on what the profession of psycho therapy has learned overthe past 100years, Rog ers (1985) said, "I don't know what the profession has learned, I really don't. I've learned to be more human in the relationship, but I am not sure that that's the direction the profession is going." Bradley (1994) , in a detailed analysis of the actual verbatim transcripts of Rogers therapy be havior, found that "Rogers expressed responses from his own frame of reference more frequently during the final, 1977-1986, phase of his work than in the earlier, 1944-1964phase" (p. 46 According to Bradley (personal communication, July 23, 1995) (Stolorow &Atwood, 1992, pp. 103-122) , specific examples ofhow the psychological biases of the therapist can influence the client.
Furthermore, on different occasions, Rogers (e.g., 1986&) I have also wondered whether Rogers had bi ases that led him to believe in mainly short-term therapy (C. R. Rogers, personal communication, August 23, 1983) . For example, Rogers & San ford (1984) Bradley, personal communication, August 12, 1995; Raskin, 1986) . Tobin (1991) offered an interesting explanation of Rogers's interest in short-term therapy. Tobin (1991) Brodley (personal communication, August 12, 1995) (Bohart, 1991, p. 41; Rogers, 1986a, pp. 207-208) . Stolorow, in making an active ex ploration of subjective experiences, seems to be taking more of an initiative than Rogers. Raskin (personal communication, August 30, 1995) Stolorow, At wood, and Brandchaft(19946, p. xi) commented, a two-person psychology allows for more flexi-bility so long as the therapist continually investi gates the impact of his/her interventions on the patient's experiences.
Conclusions
With its emphasis on listening to the subjectiv ity of the client, without theoretical preconcep tions, the client-centered approach made, per haps, its mostimportant contribution. Psychoana lysts, until the time of Kohut, tried to impose interpretations on patients, thatpatients often"re sisted"accepting. Defense and resistance became important topics in psychoanalytic theorizing, probably because of untimely interpretations. It appears that the imposing of interpretations in psychoanalysis has diminished significantly as a result of Kohut's writings. As noted earlier, it was only after a great struggle that Kohut gave up his beliefthat his interpretations were always helpful to his patients. For example, in his final work Kohut (1984) is an important step in progress for the counselor (Rogers, 1942, pp. 195-196) .
It seems that Kohut, in the 1980s, was still dis cussing this same issue.
Another important contribution, I believe, of the client-centered approachis its democratic atti tude. Carl Rogers espoused the ideals of compas periences," along with their more formal, intel lectual presentations, is that they provide a rela tively safe haven for participants to grow as persons. At self psychology conferences, where there is more of an emphasis on intellectual knowledge, such experiential interactions are. rare. Rogers, whenhe wasalive, usedtheselarge group "community meetings" to become more expressive, informal, and freer as a person (Kirschenbaum, 1979, pp. 333-334) .
The client-centered approach also has broader, more general, and I might add, perhaps more ambitious goals thanpsychoanalytic selfpsychol ogy. Thedomain of interest in self psychology is defined by its methods of investigation; that is, it is a scientific study of mental life using the tools of introspection and empathy. Clientcentered psychology, in addition to its interest in mental life and psychotherapy, is committed to broad social change. The client-centered ap proach is not entirely a scientific enterprise; its primary goal is to foster a constructive "way of being." It is important to recall that clientcentered psychology is a part of humanistic psy chology, whose aim was to enhance the lives of ordinary people, ratherthan to focus exclusively on therapy for maladjustment. Those who are client-centered or person-centered are interested in more than just doing therapy. Person-centered people wantto bringthe philosophy of the actual izing tendency and the necessary and sufficient conditions to many aspects of life outside of therapy, such as to education, parenting, business, race relations, poverty^, medicine, and interna tional relations, to name some of the areas of interest. Ruth Sanford (personal communication, July 16, 1995) before leaving for South Africa, to conduct person-centered seminars, quoted Rogers as saying "I amamazed at theimpact that this approach has had in many parts of the world and I believe it must be an idea whose time has come."
In the therapy situation, the use of the term "client,"along with thedemocratic attitude of the therapist, in the client-centered approach, helps rninimize the inequality that inevitably exists in every therapeutic relationship. In fact, Bozarth (personal communication, July, 1995) said he wants to discontinue the use of the term "client," which can also be a dehumanizing label; he would prefer tocall the individual who isreceiving ther apy, a "person." He would prefer to call "clientcentered therapy," "person-centered therapy." There is a pertinent quote by Irvin Yalom (1989) in his book "Love's Executioner" that fits per fectly with the Rogerian philosophy regarding the people who seek therapy. Yalom (1989) Rogers's attitude toward the therapeutic encoun ter seems to be fully intune with Yalom's senti ments.
Final Remarks
Afterwriting thisarticle, I have begun to think that at their core the client-centered and self psy chology approaches to psychotherapy are one.
The self psychology approach has more clothes on, is dressed up in more elaborate theorizing about selfobjects, mirror transferences, idealizing needs, organizing principles, narcissistic andoedipal fixations, and so on. What is basic to both approaches is respect for the subjectivity of the other, the valuing of the personhood of the other, and the genuine encounter between two people
The Intersubjective Perspective where the subjectivity of each is reflected upon.
